
Most founders aren’t trying to mislead their investors. They’re just using a vocabulary that has become increasingly disconnected from their bank statements.
In the early days of SaaS, Annual Recurring Revenue was a straightforward metric. It represented a simple reality: the amount of money a customer was contractually obligated to pay over the next twelve months. It provided a level of predictability that traditional businesses envied.
Lately, however, the definition of ARR has been stretched. Much like how “Adjusted EBITDA” became a flexible tool for late-stage companies to reshape their narratives, ARR is frequently diluted. We have reached a point where the “R” in ARR (Recurring) is often treated more like a goal than a guarantee.
If you’re an investor or a founder today, you are likely looking at dashboards where the numbers are technically accurate but contextually thin. This isn’t necessarily a matter of bad intent, but it is a matter of clarity.
To understand why this matters, we have to look at the hierarchy of revenue. In many pitch decks, these distinct categories are often collapsed into a single “ARR” line item, but they represent very different levels of business health.
The friction begins when a “Run Rate” or “MRR” is being presented as “ARR.” A company with $100,000 in MRR may claim $1.2M in ARR. If those customers are all on month-to-month plans, that $1.2M is a projection, not a contractual certainty. It’s a subtle distinction that carries massive weight during a market downturn.
We’re also seeing a trend where the “Annual” part of ARR is becoming a suggestion rather than a rule.
One common example is the “Out-for-Convenience” (OOC) clause. Founders often sign what looks like a $100,000 annual contract, but include a clause allowing the customer to cancel with 30 days’ notice. While this is often necessary to close a deal with a hesitant enterprise buyer, it effectively turns an annual commitment into a monthly one.
There is also the growing practice of counting trial revenue as recurring. Some startups take a three-month paid pilot and annualize it to boost their reported ARR. While a paid pilot is a fantastic signal of product-market fit, it is technically “non-recurring” until the contract converts.
Even more speculative is the inclusion of “Reserved Capacity” or waitlist projections. We occasionally see decks where founders assign a dollar value to free users or “letters of intent” and blend them into the ARR figure. While these are great indicators of demand, they aren’t yet part of the capital structure.
It is important to acknowledge that ARR is not the only “good” form of revenue. In fact, many successful businesses are built on foundations that don’t fit the classic SaaS mold.
Consumption-based models (like Snowflake or AWS) don’t always have fixed annual contracts; they scale up and down based on usage. High-margin services or implementation fees can provide the non-dilutive capital needed to bridge a gap between rounds.
The issue isn’t that these revenue streams are “bad”, it’s that they are often mislabeled. When everything is called ARR, investors lose the ability to see the actual mechanics of the business. A company with $5M in hard-contract ARR is valued very differently than a company with $5M in usage-based “Run Rate,” even if the bank balance is the same.
This dilution of metrics usually isn’t born out of a desire to deceive. It’s a byproduct of the high-pressure environment of venture-backed growth.
Founders are often told they need to hit specific milestones to unlock their next round of funding. If the target is $1M ARR and you’re at $850,000 with a $150,000 pilot in the wings, the temptation to “round up” is immense.
Investors, too, have historically been part of the problem. During the 2021 bull market, many firms optimized for speed over depth. Asking to see the specific cancellation clauses in a series of mid-market contracts was often dismissed as “nitpicking.” But as the market has cooled, those nits have turned into real problems.
We are entering a period where “trust but verify” is becoming the standard once again.
For early-stage companies, a formal Quality of Earnings (QoE) review used to be a rarity reserved for private equity buyouts. Today, it’s becoming a common part of Series A and B diligence. Investors are looking deeper into the “quality” of the dollars:
In the past, these reviews were slow and expensive, requiring weeks of manual accounting work. However, the rise of AI-driven diligence tools, like En Vérité, is changing the pace. En Vérité can audit hundreds of contracts in minutes, identifying which deals are solid and which deals may have some red flags.
Rigorous diligence isn’t an insult to a founder; it’s a way to ensure the company is actually built to last.
For founders, the best path forward is radical transparency. If your revenue is a mix of annual contracts, monthly subscriptions, and usage fees, break it out.
When a founder says, “We have $800k in contracted ARR and $400k in monthly run rate that we expect to convert to annuals next quarter,” it builds more trust than simply claiming $1.2M in ARR. It shows an understanding of the business’s underlying mechanics.
The era of “Growth at Any Cost” has been replaced by the era of “Growth You Can Count On.” ARR is still the gold standard for software valuation, but only if the letters actually mean what they say.
Building a company on clear, defensible metrics might feel slower in the short term, but it’s the only way to ensure that when you finally reach the “exit,” the floor doesn’t drop out from under you.
